Betekenis van:
moral hazard

Voorbeeldzinnen

1. Furthermore, the Commission considers that the package of measures sufficiently addresses the issue of moral hazard.
2. The objective of burden sharing is twofold: to limit distortions of competition and to address moral hazard [44].
3. As a consequence, moral hazard is adequately addressed by own contribution of past capital holders in the bank.
4. It can be seen from the restructuring plan that LBBW envisages appropriate burden sharing in accordance with the Restructuring Communication, with the result that moral hazard is avoided.
5. In this way it may create moral hazard within the banking system while weakening the incentives of the non-beneficiaries to compete, invest and innovate.
6. Moreover, they should also address moral hazard issues and ensure that State aid is not used to fund anti-competitive behaviour.
7. The restructuring plan demonstrates that ING provides an appropriate burden sharing in line with the Restructuring Communication, which is important for addressing moral hazard.
8. The Restructuring Communication indicates that an appropriate contribution by the beneficiary is necessary in order to limit the aid to minimum and to address distortions of competition and moral hazard.
9. In addition, the Commission recognises that the old owners of the bank and the management are not involved any more in the activities of Sachsen LB, which provides a valuable signal against moral hazard.
10. The Restructuring Communication indicates that an appropriate contribution by the beneficiary is necessary in order to limit the aid to a minimum and to address distortions of competition and moral hazard.
11. the ability of the proposed measures to guarantee that the distortions of competition are limited and that moral hazard is addressed by aid limited to the minimum necessary and appropriate burden-sharing of the costs between the beneficiaries and the Member States concerned.
12. Private investors in Enterprise Capital Funds may be exposed to greater downside risk than the public, thereby removing the scope for moral hazard to influence decisions of ECF operators and ensuring commercial best practice in the operation and decision making of the ECFs.
13. It is therefore appropriate to specify clear principles on sound remuneration to ensure that the structure of remuneration does not encourage excessive risk-taking by individuals or moral hazard and is aligned with the risk appetite, values and long-term interests of the credit institution or investment firm.
14. the nature of the restructuring measures proposed which failed to match up to the requirements under the Commission communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules [23] (‘Restructuring Communication’), the ability of the proposed measures to guarantee that the distortions of competition are limited and that moral hazard is addressed by aid limited to the minimum necessary and appropriate burden-sharing of the costs between the beneficiaries and the Member States concerned.